

**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY – INFORMAL MEETING:
QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

STATEMENT

BY

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TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Mr. President

First, I would like to thank you for your letter dated 18 May 2009 and the overview of the first round and makes a good contribution to our further discussions on SC reform. We take note of your overview as it has been presented to us, with the understanding that it is without prejudice to delegations' positions. There is thus no need for us to comment on some aspects of the paras 14 to 18 where we may have different views on a number of details as indeed we do. We support you in your suggestion to move forward in our discussions and are therefore happy to continue following the guidance you have given to us in para 19.

Review or challenge: We do not agree with the terminology "review or challenge", as this seems to be based on a conceptual misunderstanding. "Challenge" is tied to one particular enlargement model and is one possible outcome of a review, rather than an alternative model to it. As you know, we have advocated for a number of years an "intermediate" approach to the question of enlargement of the Security Council. A review clause constitutes a key element not only of such an intermediate approach, but was also a central element of some of the proposals tabled in the past. It is thus a common element that allows us to continue discussing without prejudice to the enlargement model we will eventually choose.

Review conference: One concern expressed about possible enlargement models is that the membership may find itself locked into a system that is not satisfactory - possible for a protracted period of time. This is particularly true with regard to the possibility of creating new permanent seats, but certainly not limited to this model.

- It is therefore instrumental that a review clause is **mandatory** and that it will take place at a **defined moment** we would have to decide on at the same time as we decide on enlargement itself. A review clause is not to be confused with a Review Conference under article 110 of the Charter – we support a review of a new model for the Security Council, but we would not support a Review Conference.

- Furthermore, its scope should be **defined**. This is necessary because otherwise there will be a lengthy and possibly inconclusive discussion on what aspects should be taken up in the course of the review. Such a delineation of the review can and should be **kept open**, i.e. while some elements should be defined, it must also be clear that other issues could form part of the review as well. The purpose of the review is to see whether the new system is functioning, maintaining flexibility is essential.
- Timing: First, the moment of review should be **linked to the entry into force** of the Charter amendments (and not the moment of their adoption). The duration of the ratification process is unpredictable, and the review must be tied to the period of time over which the new model has been in force. In order to assess the functioning of a model e.g. of long-term renewable seats, a review can take place at the earliest after we have gone twice through the length of term of such seats – perhaps even three times. A key feature of long-term seats is re-electability, and this approach is the only way that this particular feature can be tested.
- Scope: We believe that the scope should comprise, but not be limited to:
- Further enlargement: We advocate a rather modest enlargement, and the review must therefore offer an opportunity to discuss whether the new size of the Council satisfies all the needs of representation, legitimacy etc.
- Categories of seats: This should be discussed at the Review as well, both in connection with the question of size of the Council and of course with the viability of a possible system of long-term renewable seats – which in fact would be the principal novel element of this model
- Use of the veto: The veto must be part of the discussions at the Review. We hope that this discussion will lead to some results on the use of the veto – in accordance with the S5 proposals on this topic (that do not require amendments to the Charter), and the review will be another timely

opportunity to discuss this controversial feature of the work of the SC, particularly also the changes in practice that we hope we'll result from our current discussion

- Finally, as far as **frequency**, it is very clear to us that the Review should be a one-off event. Part of the review itself could of course be that another review is deemed necessary, but that is neither predictable nor is it desirable (which is also why we would not favour including it in the scope of the review at this point). But our goal must be to create a system that is sustainable – and we must avoid making the discussions on SC reform truly endless.

I thank you.